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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the health care debate, one of the targets that critics have focused 
on has been health insurance plans.  Some critics point to large profits 
for the industry, at a time when many individuals are having difficulty 
affording insurance.1  Others point to enormous rate hikes, such as 
Anthem Blue Cross of California’s much publicized proposed increase 
of rates by up to thirty-nine percent.2 
Another favorite target has been the Medicare Advantage (MA) 
program.  MA is the part of Medicare in which Medicare beneficiaries 
select a private health plan for their coverage (Part C).3  Large health 
plans such as UnitedHealthcare, Humana, and Kaiser are participants.4  
Critics frequently point to the “overpayments” that MA plans receive, in 
comparison to the costs under the traditional Medicare program.5  As 
 
 1. See Nicole Gaouette, Humana’s Profit Criticized by Senate Leader’s Aide, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=ahuWRmei0TW0 
(quoting Jim Manley, aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, “It’s no wonder why Humana has 
been misleading seniors about health insurance reform . . . . They saw their profits rise 65 percent 
last quarter and want to make sure the gravy train doesn’t end.”); Health Insurance Industry Profits 
Surge Again, HEALTH CARE FOR AM. NOW (2010), http://hcfan.3cdn.net/ 
d605c2281191ac1f04_kam6bn3ga.pdf (subtitled “Fewer Members, Skimpier Benefits, Lower 
Spending on Care Add Up for Investors While Consumers Suffer”). 
 2. See Nadja Popovich, Insurer's Rate Hike Becomes Administration Talking Point, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 9, 2010, 9:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/02/ 
insurers_rate_hike_becomes_adm.html.  This proposed increase was later rescinded when it was 
found that Anthem had made actuarial errors in determining its projected costs.  See Scott Hensley, 
California Insurer Drops Rate Hikes After Errors Are Found, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 30, 2010, 
9:15 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/04/california_insurer_drops_rate.html. 
 3. OFFICE OF HEALTH POL’Y, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & 
EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PAYMENT FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
PLANS:  POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS v (2009), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/09/ 
medicareadvantage/report.pdf [hereinafter PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS]. 
 4. Marsha Gold, Dawn Phelps, Gretchen Jacobson & Tricia Neuman, Medicare Advantage 
2010 Data Spotlight:  Plan Enrollment Patterns and Trends, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 5 (June 
2010), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8080.pdf. 
 5. See Jill Wechsler, Medicare Advantage Plans Under Attack, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXEC., 
Mar. 1, 2007, http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com/mhe/Politics+and+Policy/ 
Medicare-Advantage-plans-under-attack/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/409178 (noting that “MA plans 
are ‘vastly overpaid,’ according to Rep. Pete Stark (D-Calif.), chairman of the House Ways & Means 
Health subcommittee.”); Philip Rucker, Hidden Costs of Medicare Advantage:  Plans’ Free Perks Are 
Subsidized By Government, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/14/AR2009101403953_pf.html (quoting Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV 
(D-W.Va.), “[Medicare Advantage is] a wasteful, inefficient program and always has been. . . . [It is] 
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determined by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 
“MA payments per enrollee are projected to be 114 percent of 
comparable FFS [fee-for-service] spending for 2009.”6 
There are two problems in “demonizing”7 health insurance plans 
and MA.8  One is that it diverts attention from perhaps the most 
important long-term problem for health care:  the need to control rising 
costs.  Recent estimates say that expenditures on health care have grown 
from approximately seven percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
1970, to nine percent in 1980, twelve percent in 1990, fourteen percent 
in 2000, and sixteen percent in 2008.9  Expenditures are projected to be 
over nineteen percent of GDP in 2019.10  While it is certainly true that 
health care insurance plans are not perfect and that there have been 
“wasteful”11 benefits offered by MA plans, simply addressing these will 
not effectively control future health care costs. 
Rising costs are primarily a function of inappropriate incentives in 
the delivery of health care.  As Adam Smith noted in The Wealth of 
Nations, prices are the “invisible hand” that guides market participants.12  
In most markets, prices act as signals to both producers and consumers.  
However, in health care in the United States, prices simply do not work. 
                                                                                                                                 
stuffing money into the pockets of private insurers, and it doesn’t provide any better benefits to 
anybody.”); Ezra Klein, The Medicare Advantage Scam, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2009/10/the_medicare_advantage_scam.html.  
 6. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  MEDICARE 
PAYMENT POLICY xix (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/ 
Mar09_EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT]. 
 7. See Press Release, America’s Health Insurance Plans, AHIP Statement on Status of Health 
Care Reform (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ahip.org/content/ 
pressrelease.aspx?docid=27953 (claiming that “a campaign has been launched to demonize health 
plans”).  See also Relapse:  The Battle Between Politicians and Insurers Is Not Over, ECONOMIST, 
May 15, 2010, at 74 (noting that “the administration is demonising insurers in an effort to transform 
the new health law from an electoral liability into an asset”). 
 8. The Wall Street Journal editorial board also recently noted the dual attacks on health plans 
and MA.  See Farewell, Medicare Advantage, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2010, at A18 (noting that 
“[t]his terror explains why Democrats are so intent on killing Medicare Advantage, and on blaming 
someone else [health plans] for destroying a program that millions of seniors prefer”). 
 9. National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., tab.1 
(2009), http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf [hereinafter NHE 
Data]. 
 10. NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 
2011) [hereinafter NHE Fact Sheet]. 
 11. Rucker, supra note 5. 
 12. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
IV.2.9 (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed. 1904), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/ 
Smith/smWN13.html. 
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The health care system has created a number of distortions that 
impede the ability of prices to perform their signaling function.  The 
predominant mode of compensating doctors is through “fee-for-service,” 
in which a doctor receives compensation based on a list of services 
performed.13  The “price” for each service is based on a “cost-plus” 
model,14 where the doctor receives essentially the marginal cost of the 
service plus an additional amount, which is designed to be enough to 
cover a certain percentage of fixed costs and provide income for the 
doctor.  This system provides a strong incentive for doctors to over 
provide services because their profits (based on the “plus” part of the 
“cost-plus” model) increase consistently with greater quantities.  
Furthermore, there is a stronger incentive to provide more costly services 
because their “plus” part is larger than lower cost services. 
Many have pointed to inefficient incentives created under the “fee-
for-service” system as being the primary cause of the rising costs of 
health care.15  In response, a number of recommended changes to the 
health care payment system have been suggested.16  These include pay-
for-performance, competitive pricing, accountable care organizations, 
and bundled payments.17  Each of these plays a role in the landmark 
health care reform legislation signed by President Barack Obama, the 
 
 13. Exec. Office of the President, Council of Econ. Advisors, The Economic Case for Health 
Care Reform, 14 (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/CEA_Health_Care_ 
Report.pdf.  [hereinafter COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS].  The other predominant form of payment is 
via a “capitation rate” in which a health plan receives a fixed amount per person (per head) enrolled 
in the plan.  See MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.   
 14. See Bryan E. Dowd, Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman, & Steven D. Pizer, Fee-for-
Service Medicare in a Competitive Market Environment, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 113, 113 
(2005-06), available at https://www.cms.gov/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads/05-
06Winpg113.pdf. 
 15. See infra Part II.  This article focuses on the problems associated with the pricing system 
for payment for medical service providers, which is primarily done via federal programs such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, along with payment by health insurance plans.  However, other literature 
examines problems with payment systems on the other side of the equation:  the consumers of 
medical services.  See, e.g., Stephen P. Paschall, Health Care, the Price System and the Conflict 
Between Access to Care and Cost-Containment, 43 J. ECON. ISSUES 403 (2009).  In the opinion of 
this author, pricing reform on the supplier-side will be more effective than on the demand side, due 
to difficulties with individual consumers’ ability to correctly quantify the value of a specific medical 
service.  For more on the problems of valuing esoteric goods such as environmental goods, see Dale 
B. Thompson, Valuing the Environment:  Courts’ Struggles with Natural Resource Damages, 32 
ENVTL. L. 57 (2002).  For these reasons, this article will not address pricing reforms on the health 
consumer side. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III.A-D. 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act18 and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.19  The package also regulates 
health plans and reduces payments under MA.20  Nonetheless, while 
these approaches should improve the delivery of health care, they will 
not lead to any fundamental changes in health care incentives.  In order 
to address rising health care costs, we will need a new approach, a new 
metric for health care payments. 
The other problem in “demonizing” health insurance plans and MA 
is that, in thinking that they are the problem, we lose track that they may 
be part of the solution to the long-term need to control costs.  In fact, this 
article argues that health care insurance plans participating in MA offer 
the best opportunity to transform incentives in health care. 
This article proposes a systemic change to the payment system used 
by the MA program.  Under this new system, health plans would be 
rewarded, not on the basis of how much care was provided, but rather on 
the effectiveness of the care.  In other words, these plans will receive 
payments based on their delivery of “health outcomes,” not their 
delivery of health services.  Health outcomes include measures of 
survival, data “derived from symptoms or even the results of physical 
examinations,” and “the results of simple tests, like blood levels, or more 
complex physiological measures.”21  They also include “information 
collected from patients, . . . reflect[ing] how they have experienced the 
illness and the effects it has had on their lives.”22  A number of obstacles 
have hindered the consideration of using health outcomes alone as the 
basis of a practical payment system,23 but this article argues that these 
obstacles can and should be overcome. 
When their payments depend on health outcomes, health insurance 
plans will have incentives to improve the quality and cost effectiveness 
of health care, and these improvements will spread throughout these 
organizations to the individual doctor level and also on to their patients.  
 
 18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
[hereinafter PPACA].  
 19. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010) [hereinafter HCERA]. 
 20. Anne Tergesen, Changes to Medicare Advantage, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB127336164057988979.html (noting that “the new health-care law 
will divert some $132 billion from Medicare Advantage”). 
 21. ROBERT L. KANE, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE OUTCOMES RESEARCH 5 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Some have proposed using health outcomes to determine whether providers are eligible 
for bonus payments.  See infra Part III.C. 
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This approach has the benefit of using decentralized enforcement, with 
flexible incentives tailored to individual contexts.24 
The rest of this article is as follows.  We begin with an analysis of 
the improper incentives generated under the fee-for-service system, and 
then examine alternatives previously suggested.25  We also examine how 
the landmark health care reform legislation of 2010 addresses these 
incentives.26  We then present a different payment system based on 
health outcomes, explaining how it would be implemented and 
examining some of the challenges in doing so.27 
Drawing on previous research on environmental policies and 
federalism, we find that, in order to be implemented properly, this 
payment system should be directed at the level of health care plans.28  
We then examine the opportunity for implementing this system at the 
level of health plans afforded by MA.29  We conclude with an analysis of 
the obstacles and opportunities of this approach.30 
II.  IMPROPER INCENTIVES UNDER FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
In the past forty years, health care expenditures have risen from 
seven percent of GDP to over sixteen percent.31  Within the next ten 
years, they are expected to reach approximately one-fifth of GDP.32  As 
a cause of this rise, a number of authorities have pointed to significant 
problems with the fee-for-service payment system.  These problems 
derive from the incentives generated under this system.  These incentives 
lead to too much care being provided, with a significant portion of that 
care being of dubious value. 
For example, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) explained, in its June 2009 Report to the Congress, that we 
are “not buying enough recommended care” but are instead “buying too 
much unnecessary care, much of it at very high prices, resulting in a 
system that costs significantly more per capita than in any other 
 
 24. It will be difficult to develop these tailored incentives over large and diverse networks of 
physicians, but over time, we may expect improvements in the management of these networks.  See 
infra Part VI.C. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See infra Part V. 
 28. See infra Part VI. 
 29. See infra Part VII. 
 30. See infra Part VIII. 
 31. NHE Data, supra note 9, at tab.1. 
 32. NHE Fact Sheet, supra note 10. 
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country.”33  The principal reason cited by MedPAC is that “Medicare’s 
fee-for-service (FFS) payment systems reward more care—and more 
complex care—without regard to the quality or value of that care.”34 
Health care expert David Cutler of Harvard has noted a similar 
conundrum, where “the marginal value of many services is low and 
many people go without valuable care.”35  He gives examples of the 
overuse of “high-tech medical services,” and notes that “Medicare 
spending, for example, varies by a factor of two between different 
regions of the country, with the gap typically associated with differential 
use of very expensive procedures.”36  Despite these spending disparities, 
“[p]eople appear no healthier in regions that spend more compared to 
regions that spend less.”37  On the other hand, Cutler also notes that an 
important example of the under-provision of health care is for 
prescription drugs:  “Less than half of patients who would benefit from 
beta blockers after a heart attack receive these drugs . . . despite the fact 
that such drugs cut the mortality risk in half.” 38  For the cause of these 
inefficiencies, Cutler points to both the fee-for-service system and the 
low out-of-pocket costs for patients with strong insurance coverage, 
causing them to “demand care with any medical value.”39  He concludes 
that “[o]n both the demand and supply sides of the market, the incentives 
are to overconsume high-tech care.”40 
President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors described these 
and other inefficiencies of fee-for-service in The Economic Case for 
Health Care Reform.41  In addition to the incentives to increase volume 
under fee-for-service, the FFS system also may “reward poor quality of 
 
 33. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Report to the Congress:  Improving Incentives in 
the Medicare Program, xi (June 2009), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09_EntireReport.pdf 
[hereinafter June 2009 MEDPAC Report]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. David M. Cutler, Walking the Tightrope on Medicare Reform, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
45, 51(2000); Donald A. Brand, Lee N. Newcomer, Anne Freiburger & Hao Tian, Cardiologists’ 
Practices Compared with Practice Guidelines:  Use of Beta-Blockade After Acute Myocardial 
Infarction, 26 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 1432, 1435 (1995); Stephen B. Soumerai, Thomas J. 
McLaughlin, Donna Spiegelman, Ellen Hertzmark, George Thibault & Lee Goldman, Adverse 
Outcomes of Underuse of β-Blockers in Elderly Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction, 277 
JAMA 115, 119-20 (1997); Thomas J. Wang & Randall S. Stafford, National Patterns and 
Predictors of β-Blocker Use in Patients with Coronary Artery Disease, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED.  1901, 1903-05 (1998). 
 36. Cutler, supra note 35, at 51.   
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 52. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 14. 
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care by paying for the costs associated with additional medical care 
necessary to fix errors that could have been prevented.”42  Also, the FFS 
system generates “strong financial incentives to compete on the basis of 
technology adoption rather than price, leading to an excess supply of 
high technology equipment and services (for example, MRI machines 
and minimally invasive vascular diagnostic and procedure suites) and 
accelerated replacement of hospital beds in local markets.”43  Another 
significant problem is due to the lack of incentives under the FFS system 
“for effectively managing patients with chronic illnesses or educating 
patients about preventing disease through lifestyle changes such as 
exercise, improved nutrition, and smoking cessation.”44 
Harold Miller, another “national expert on health care reform,”45 
makes similar critiques.  He notes, “Payment systems for health care 
today are based on rewarding volume, not value for the money spent.”46  
Meanwhile, he explains, “Current payment systems often penalize 
providers financially for keeping people healthy, reducing errors and 
complications, and avoiding unnecessary care.”47 
Thus, we see that the fee-for-service system creates incentives by 
rewarding volume but not quality or outcomes.  This leads to a number 
of problems:  provision of a substantial amount of care with little value, 
under-provision of other care with higher value, perverse incentives for 
poor quality care as services to correct for earlier errors lead to higher 
levels of compensation, excessive use of high technology equipment, an 
oversupply of hospital beds, and insufficient incentives for managing 
and educating patients through low-cost ways of improving their health.  
In the end, this payment system rewards health care providers more if 
their patients are less healthy. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO FEE-FOR-SERVICE 
As Stuart Guterman and others have noted, “To change the way 
health care is organized and delivered, we need to change the way it is 
 
 42. Id. (citing David Studdert, Michelle Mello, William M. Sage, Catherine M. DesRoches, 
Jordan Peugh, Kinga Zapert, & Troyen A. Brennan, Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk 
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2616 (2005)). 
 43. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 13, at 14. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Sarah A. Rigg, An Interview with Harold Miller, DETROIT BUS. NEWS, July, 29, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.mlive.com/business/detroit/index.ssf/2009/07/an_interview_with_harold_mille.html. 
 46. Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value:  Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 1418, 1418 (2009). 
 47. Id. 
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paid for—mov[ing away] from FFS payments.”48  One way to do this 
would be to adopt a capitation model, where providers are paid a 
specified amount (which may be risk adjusted) for each beneficiary they 
service.49  This is the model adopted by the MA program, prior to the 
modifications under the health reform legislation.50  However, the 
capitation model also leads to inappropriate incentives.  As noted by 
Robert Mechanic and Stuart Altman, “capitation creates financial 
incentives for physicians to withhold care.”51 
Instead, in order to combat the perverse incentives created by the 
fee-for-service system, scholars have suggested a variety of other 
approaches.  These include a pay-for-performance (frequently referred to 
as either P4P or value-based purchasing) system, competitive pricing, 
accountable care organizations, and bundled payment systems.  After 
examining these, we will see how these alternatives were incorporated 
into the health care reform legislative package. 
A. Pay-for-Performance 
Pay-for-performance is a payment system in which providers of 
health services receive bonuses for meeting certain performance 
targets.52  Much of the time, the measures used to determine pay for 
performance are simply whether certain treatment guidelines are 
followed.53  For example, measures to assess the quality of ambulatory 
care include the use of certain screening tests, vaccinations, and 
therapies.54  The recent interest in pay-for-performance began with two 
reports issued by the Institute of Medicine in 1999 and 2001.55 
 
 48. Stuart Guterman, Karen Davis, Stephen Schoenbaum & Anthony Shih, Using Medicare 
Payment Policy to Transform the Health System: A Framework for Improving Performance, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 238, 239 (2009). 
 49. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 7.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Robert E. Mechanic & Stuart H. Altman, Payment Reform Options:  Episode Payment Is a 
Good Place to Start, 28 HEALTH AFF.  262, 266 (2009). 
 52. Kathleen J. Mullen, Richard G. Frank & Merideth B. Rosenthal, Can You Get What You 
Pay For?  Pay-for-Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers 2 (Rand Labor and 
Population, Working Paper No. WR-680, 2009), available at http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/working_papers/2009/RAND_WR680.pdf.   
 53. Id. 
 54. See INST. OF MED., PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT:  ACCELERATING IMPROVEMENT,  204-
06 tbl.G-1 (2006), available at http://books.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id=11517&page=204. 
 55. JIM HAHN, PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN HEALTH CARE 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/3009.pdf (citing INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (1999); INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE 
QUALITY CHASM:  A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001)).   
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A number of pay-for-performance experiments were tried in the 
early 2000s.  The results were not promising.  Meredith Rosenthal notes, 
“Both the enthusiastic adoption and somewhat lackluster early results of 
pay for performance have given rise to a broader payment-reform 
movement.”56 
In an early study of pay-for-performance, Rosenthal and others 
found little improvement from the adoption of a pay-for-performance 
program:  “Paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed performance 
target may produce little gain in quality for the money spent and will 
largely reward those with higher performance at baseline.”57  In a more 
recent study, Rosenthal and others similarly conclude, “[W]e fail to find 
evidence that a large P4P initiative either resulted in major improvement 
in quality or notable disruption in care.”58 
However, some have suggested that there have been some limited 
successes.  Francis J. (Jay) Crosson notes that “the modest pay-for-
performance (P4P) incentives in the CMS Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration and the Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration have succeeded.”59 
A number of reasons have been suggested for the poor performance 
of pay-for-performance.  Some point to the inappropriate metrics utilized 
by pay-for-performance systems, i.e., the use of a particular treatment as 
recommended by the guidelines.  Consequently, these payment systems 
create incentives to follow these guidelines, without any direct 
connection to whether these guidelines are successful for individual 
patients. 
Elliott Fisher and others have criticized pay-for-performance (P4P) 
mechanisms because they provide incentives at the wrong level—the 
individual doctor level.60  This focus is inappropriate because, as they 
 
 56. Meredith B. Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance—Emerging Models of Provider-
Payment Reform, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED.  1197, 1197 (2008) (describing a number of payment 
reform models, including refusing payment for “avoidable complications,” “primary care payment 
reform” such as payment under capitation, “episode-based payment,” and “shared savings”).  See 
also Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264 (2009) (stating that “few programs have been 
formally evaluated, and those that have show mixed results”). 
 57. Meredith B. Rosenthal, Richard G. Frank, Zhonghe Li & Arnold M. Epstein, Early 
Experience with Pay-for-Performance:  From Concept to Practice, 294 JAMA 1788, 1788 (2009). 
 58. Mullen et al., supra note 52, at 28. 
 59. Francis J. Crosson, Medicare: The Place to Start Delivery System Reform, 28 HEALTH 
AFF.  232, 233 (2009) (noting however that “there is little evidence that small (2-5 percent) payment 
incentives are likely to drive individual specialists”).    
 60. Elliott S. Fisher, Douglas O. Staiger, Julie P.W. Bynum & Daniel J. Gottlieb, Creating 
Accountable Care Organizations:  The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. 44, 44 
(2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2131738/. 
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note, “The provision of high-quality care for any serious illness requires 
coordinated, longitudinal care and the engagement of multiple 
professionals across different institutional settings.”61  The focus on 
individual doctors is also problematic because “many of the most serious 
gaps in quality can be attributed to poor coordination and faulty 
transitions.”62 
Another part of the problem with pay-for-performance is that, as it 
is currently designed and implemented, it provides incentives to improve 
quality but without regard for cost.  As James Robinson and others have 
noted, “The turn toward quality improvement and away from cost 
moderation improved quality but helped fuel the resurgence of cost 
inflation.”63  Thus, pay-for-performance, similar to fee-for-service, 
creates a disincentive to adopting cost-effective treatments that are not 
specifically designated under the treatment guidelines. 
A policy paper issued by researchers at the U.S. Department of 
Human Services examines whether pay-for-performance should be 
applied to MA.64  They note a number of difficulties in applying pay-for-
performance to MA.  These difficulties include: 
[A] lack of sufficient health outcomes measures (as opposed to process 
and satisfaction measures that are captured by HEDIS [Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set] and CAHPS [Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems]), and that this would 
be an important limiting factor in the ability to accurately measure and 
reward plan performance.65 
Similar to the arguments above, they note that “while there are 
reasons to believe that these types of programs can improve 
beneficiaries’ health while reducing costs, there is not definitive 
evidence that they will lead to improved performance.”66 
 
 61. Id. at 45. 
 62. Id. 
 63. James C. Robinson, Thomas Williams & Dolores Yanagihara, Measurement of and 
Reward for Efficiency in California’s Pay-for-Performance Program, 28 HEALTH AFF.  1438, 1439 
(2009).  See also Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264 (noting that “P4P programs are 
unlikely to affect spending trends as long as their primary emphasis is rewarding providers for 
delivering ‘underused’ services rather than for judicious use of potentially ‘overused’ treatments”); 
Robert Galvin, Pay-for-Performance:  Too Much of a Good Thing?  A Conversation with Martin 
Roland, 25 HEALTH AFF. 412 (2006) (discussing a P4P plan in the United Kingdom with actual 
payments that exceeded expected payments by almost 40%:  $2.5 billion instead of $1.8 billion). 
 64. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS,  supra note 3, at 24. 
 65. Id. at 25. 
 66. Id. 
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B. Competitive Pricing 
Robert Berenson notes that the traditional Medicare FFS 
benchmarks used for establishing MA payments are inappropriate, due to 
differential market settings.67  Berenson notes that “in areas with the 
highest traditional Medicare spending, health plans’ bids are about 10 
percent below traditional Medicare spending, while in the lowest-
spending traditional Medicare areas, plans’ bids are about 21 percent 
above traditional program spending.”68  This is because the benchmarks 
“do not reflect cost differences faced by local plans as a result of local 
market factors.”69 
To address these concerns, Bryan Dowd, Robert Berenson, and 
others have suggested using a competitive pricing model.70  Under a 
competitive pricing model, health plans submit bids for servicing their 
enrolled beneficiaries.  These bids would be to provide a “‘community 
norm’ [benefit] package that [would] include supplementary benefits.”71  
These bids are based on the expected costs of servicing these 
beneficiaries.  These bids would then be used to determine benchmarks 
for establishing how much of the plans would be paid by Medicare.72  
Plans whose bids exceeded the benchmarks would be required to collect 
the difference in the form of premiums from beneficiaries. 
In February 2009, the Obama administration proposed the adoption 
of competitive pricing for MA plans.73  Bryan Dowd, Robert Coulam, 
and Roger Feldman have proposed extending the competitive pricing 
model to all Medicare plans, not just MA ones.74  However, competitive 
 
 67. Robert A. Berenson, From Politics to Policy:  A New Payment Approach in Medicare 
Advantage, 27 HEALTH AFF. 156, 160 (2008). 
 68. Id. at 160. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  See also Dowd et al., supra note 14, at 117. 
 71. Robert A. Berenson & Bryan E. Dowd, Medicare Advantage Plans at A Crossroads—Yet 
Again, 28 HEALTH AFF.  29, 31 (2009). 
 72. One approach suggested by Bryan Dowd and others is to set the benchmark at the lowest 
bid for the geographical area.  See Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman & Bryan E. Dowd, 
Competitive Pricing for All Medicare Health Plans, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH  
(2009), http://www.aei.org/outlook/100060 (noting that this would have benefits for low bidders 
through increased enrollments and penalties for high bidders).  Other approaches to setting the 
benchmark based on these bids are also possible, such as a second-price auction, which reduces 
incentives to inflate bids. 
 73. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY:  RENEWING 
AMERICA’S PROMISE  28 (2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-
newera.pdf. 
 74. Coulam et al., supra note 72, at 1. 
9-THOMPSON 44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:11 PM 
2011] THE NEXT STAGE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 739 
pricing proposals have faced significant political opposition.75  In the 
past twenty-five years, attempts to utilize competitive pricing have been 
frequently scuttled as a result of this opposition.76 
This history repeated itself in the current health reform legislation.  
Section 320177 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
mandated that MA benchmarks would be based on competitive bids.78  
However, section 1102 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act repealed section 3201, replacing the Competitive Bidding structure 
with one based on Medicare FFS rates.79 
C. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) 
Another significant proposal has been a call for “Accountable Care 
Organizations” (ACOs).  Elliott Fisher and others have suggested that 
significant improvements can be made by shifting payment systems 
away from the level of the individual doctor, and instead creating a 
payment system directed at “accountable care organizations comprising 
local hospitals and the physicians who work within and around them.”80  
They note a number of advantages to this approach.81  One is related to 
performance measures.82  They cite a need for “measures that focus on 
the longitudinal experience of Medicare beneficiaries (including 
measures of total costs and health outcomes), as well as measures that 
directly address the current fragmentation of care.”83  They conclude, 
“Aggregating performance measurement to the level of large physician 
groups is the only approach, we believe, to achieving this dual 
 
 75. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at vi (noting that “in the past, . . . health plans 
and their supporters have resisted such a bidding approach”); id. at 18 (“[A competitive bidding] 
system, as in any competitive market, means increased uncertainty about the chances for reward and 
the risk of financial loss for participants.  Previous experience with Medicare’s competitive pricing 
demonstrations, which were opposed by the insurance industry, suggests that health plans are 
reluctant to participate under such pricing uncertainty.”) (citing Berenson et al., supra note 71, at 
30-32). 
 76. See id. at 29; Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman & Bryan E. Dowd, Don’t Forget to Save 
Medicare:  Competitive Pricing, Not Price Controls, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH, 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Handout%20on%20Medicare%20Competitive%20Pricing%20Attempts.
pdf.  See also Dowd et al., supra note 14, at 117 (describing how demonstration projects were 
“blocked” by Congress, with the aid of a Federal judge). 
 77. Unless otherwise noted, all section references of the PPACA refer to TITLE III—
Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care. 
 78. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3201(a), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 79. HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152,  § 1102(a), 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 80. Fisher et al., supra note 60, at 45. 
 81. Id. at 51. 
 82. Id. at 52. 
 83. Id.  
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objective.”84  They also note that “physicians’ resistance to public 
reporting could be mitigated by aggregation to these larger entities.”85  
Finally, there are economies of scale in collecting this information:  “The 
administrative complexity of data collection methods and auditing 
procedures for 5,000 hospitals would be much less daunting than those 
required to collect and audit data on the 500,000 physicians practicing in 
the United States.”86 
Another advantage of a payment system at the level of an ACO 
would be to “establish accountability for local decisions about 
capacity.”87  Their final advantage is due to another economy of scale: 
Larger organizations [have the] capacity to invest in improving quality 
and lowering costs.  Most physicians remain in solo or small group 
practices and have neither the capital nor organizational capacity to 
invest in health information systems, the implementation of care 
management protocols, or ongoing quality improvement initiatives.  
Hospitals or large medical groups are much better positioned to invest 
in such systems and to provide financial and technical support to 
physicians aligned with their institution.88 
In another article, Elliott Fisher and others lay out how the ACO 
system would operate.89  They would utilize a “clear and specific 
spending benchmark for each ACO”90 based upon “the most recent three 
years of per beneficiary total parts A and B spending for beneficiaries 
assigned to the ACO.”91  They would also utilize performance 
measures.92  Currently, the measures would be quality-based, but might 
extend to outcomes in the future:  “[W]e believe that these measures 
should rapidly move from the current generation of technical quality 
measures to focus on patient-level health outcome and experience 
measures that reflect ACOs’ ability to deliver patient-centered care that 
is well coordinated across providers and improves outcomes for 
patients.”93  However, the payment mechanism recommended here still 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 53. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Elliott S. Fisher, Mark B. McClellan, John Bertko, Steven M. Lieberman, Julie J. Lee, 
Julie L. Lewis & Jonathan S. Skinner, Fostering Accountable Health Care:  Moving Forward in 
Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. 219, 219 (2009) [hereinafter Fostering Accountable Health Care]. 
 90. Id. at 223. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 221. 
 93. Id. at 223. 
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creates a binary incentive:  those ACOs that meet the performance 
standards are entitled to “shared savings,”94 but the amount of this 
payment is not adjusted based upon an individual ACO’s specific report 
of these statistics.  In other words, as long as the performance targets are 
met, an ACO receives no additional savings for better performance. 
In its June 2009 Report to Congress, MedPAC advocated the use of 
ACOs.95  This was because “financial incentives would lead the ACO to 
judiciously constrain the use of health care services and capacity in 
contrast to the incentive in FFS payment systems to always increase the 
volume of services.”96  This report also explained how this would be 
implemented:  “Providers in voluntary ACOs would continue to be paid 
standard FFS Medicare payment rates.  Bonuses would depend on 
meeting both spending and quality targets.”97 
One study of the effects of coordination of care on health outcomes 
had discouraging results.  Deborah Peikes and others concluded that 
essentially there were no differences in hospitalization rates:  “Thirteen 
of the 15 programs showed no significant . . . differences in 
hospitalizations; however, Mercy had 0.168 fewer hospitalizations per 
person per year . . . and Charlestown had 0.118 more hospitalizations per 
person per year.”98  They also found that “none of the 15 programs 
generated net savings,” and that “[t]hese programs had favorable effects 
on none of the adherence measures and only a few of many quality of 
care indicators examined.”99  Their results suggested that cost savings 
were unlikely, but that some cost-neutral improvements in “patients’ 
well-being” could be possible.100  Thus, while there are significant 
theoretical advantages in an ACO model, additional evidence is needed 
to determine their actual effects. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act contains two 
sections directed at ACOs:  Section 2706 of title II, the “Pediatric 
Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project,”101 and section 
 
 94. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395(2010) (amending title XVIII of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii) by adding at the end § 1899, § 1899(a)(1)(B) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(B) (2010))). 
 95. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at xiii. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 44. 
 98. Deborah Peikes, Arnold Chen, Jennifer Schore & Randall Brown, Effects of Care 
Coordination on Hospitalization, Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 301 JAMA 603, 603 (2009). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 615. 
 101. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2706, 124 Stat. 119, 325 (2010). 
9-THOMPSON 44.3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM 8/15/2011  2:11 PM 
742 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:727 
3022 of title III, the “Medicare Shared Savings Program.”102  These will 
be discussed more below. 
D. Bundling Payments for Episodes of Care 
Other pricing reforms include “[c]hanging the method of payment 
for hospital care from reimbursement for individual services to 
prospectively set prices per case” on the basis of “diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs).”103  Extensions of this include “bundl[ing] payments for 
episodes of care,” as advocated by Robert Mechanic and Stuart 
Altman,104 and Stuart Guterman and others.105 
The intention of this system would be to “encourage greater 
integration in the organization of health care delivery and the provision 
of more coordinated care to beneficiaries.”106  Under this system, 
“physician group practices,” “hospital systems,” and “integrated delivery 
systems (IDSs)” would receive a bundled payment.107  These bundled 
payments could either be a “global fee for primary care,” a “global DRG 
[diagnosis-related group] case rate for hospitalization,” or a “global 
payment per enrollee [a risk adjusted, pure capitation model].”108  To be 
entitled to receive these payments, providers would need to demonstrate 
that they meet certain quality standards, shown by “obtain[ing] category-
specific certification or accreditation by organizations such as the Joint 
Commission or NCQA.”109  They would also include “[r]ewards for 
provider performance,” for “providers who perform well and show 
improvement on relevant sets of performance metrics.”110 
They do note, however, certain impediments to implementing this 
system, including concerns about “the assumption of risk for large 
losses” and “the need to implement new systems to meet the 
requirements for participation and accreditation/certification—such as 
better implementation of evidence-based guidelines and rapid 
 
 102. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395iii) by adding at the end § 1899, § 1899 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2010))). 
 103. S. E. Berki, DRGs, Incentives, Hospitals, and Physicians, 4 HEALTH AFF.  70, 70 (1985).  
See also RICK MAYES & ROBERT A. BERENSON, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE 
SHAPING OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 40 (2006). 
 104. Mechanic & Altman,  supra note 51, at 264. 
 105. Guterman et al., supra note 48, at 238. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 240. 
 108. Id. at 242-43. 
 109. Id. at 241. 
 110. Id. at 244. 
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performance reporting.”111  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act contains one section directed at this alternative, section 3023:  the 
“National Pilot Program on Payment Bundling.”112 
IV.  REFORMS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT AND THE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION 
ACT 
All of these previous proposals play a significant role in the 
landmark health reform legislation package.113  Pay-for-performance, 
under its “value-based purchasing” name, plays a prominent role in 
many sections.  Following up on provisions of the Medicare 
Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) which 
“require[d] the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services to develop a plan to transition to a value-based purchasing 
program for Medicare payment,”114 sections 3001, 3006, and 3007 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act respectively require the 
establishment of pay-for-performance programs for hospitals,115 “skilled 
nursing facilities and home health agencies,”116 and individual 
physicians.117  These programs again reward medical service providers 
for the use of tests, vaccinations, and therapies specified by performance 
standards.118 
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are featured in sections 
2706 of title II119 and 3022 of title III120 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.  Section 2706 sets up a demonstration project for 
ACOs providing pediatric services.  ACOs must meet “guidelines to 
 
 111. Id. at 247-48. 
 112. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3023, 124 Stat. 119, 399 (2010) (amending title XVIII of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii) by inserting § 1866D (codified as amended at 
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2010))). 
 113. As noted above, competitive pricing initially was part of the reform legislation, but was 
repealed by the second act. 
 114. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN TO TRANSITION TO A 
MEDICARE VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM FOR PHYSICIAN AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES 3 (2008), available at http://www.cms.gov/physicianfeesched/downloads/physicianvbp-
plan-issues-paper.pdf. 
 115. PPACA § 3001(o)(1)(A). 
 116. Id. § 3006(a)(1). 
 117. Id. § 3007(p)(1). 
 118. See generally Mullen et al., supra note 52, at 16. 
 119. PPACA § 2706. 
 120. Id. § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395iii) 
by adding at the end § 1899, § 1899(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1) 
(2010))). 
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ensure that the quality of care”121 is high, and meet an “annual minimal 
level of savings”122 in order to receive an incentive payment.  Section 
3022 sets up a “Medicare Shared Savings Program”123 for ACOs.124  In a 
similar manner, an ACO is entitled to “shared savings” if it “meets 
quality performance standards,”125 and “if the estimated average per 
capita Medicare expenditures under the ACO for Medicare fee-for-
service beneficiaries for parts A and B services, adjusted for beneficiary 
characteristics, is at least the percent specified by the Secretary below 
the applicable benchmark.”126 
It is important to note that, while these ACOs must meet a certain 
level of quality based on prescribed measures, this is only a threshold 
test.  Once the ACO meets these measures, their incentive payment is 
completely unrelated to quality or outcomes of patient health, but rather 
is related to spending levels.127  Consequently, this cost-based 
mechanism fails to provide a significant incentive to improve quality 
beyond the threshold levels or to specifically improve patient health 
outcomes. 
Section 3023 sets up a “National Pilot Program on Payment 
Bundling.”128  This program makes payments for “integrated care during 
an episode of care provided to an applicable beneficiary around a 
hospitalization.”129  Providers eligible for this program include “a 
hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a home health 
agency.”130  These providers are paid “for the furnishing of applicable 
services and other appropriate services, such as care coordination, 
medication reconciliation, discharge planning, transitional care services, 
and other patient-centered activities.”131  These providers will also be 
required to report information on “quality measures” including a number 
 
 121. PPACA § 2706(c)(1). 
 122. Id. § 2706(c)(2). 
 123. Id. § 3022. 
 124. It should be noted that health plans providing services under MA are not eligible for this 
program.  PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395iii), § 1899(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(2010))). 
 125. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395iii), § 1899(d)(1)(A)(i) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(A)(i) (2010))). 
 126. PPACA § 3022 (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395iii), § 1899(d)(1)(B)(i) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(i) (2010))). 
 127. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 44. 
 128. PPACA § 3023. 
 129. Id. § 3023.  In a similar manner, beneficiaries participating in MA are not eligible for this 
program.  Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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of measurements of health outcomes.132  However, payments will not be 
adjusted according to performance on these quality measures. 
The reform legislation includes a number of other provisions, 
including the “[r]equirement to maintain minimum essential coverage” 
by all individuals,133 “employer responsibilities,”134 and regulations of 
health insurance plans.135  Many provisions relate to the financing of 
these policy changes.  One such provision is the change to payment 
formula for MA, section 1102 of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act.136  This provision modifies the amount paid to MA 
plans based upon Medicare fee-for-service rates.137  It establishes a new 
benchmark that is equal to one hundred percent of the FFS rate for the 
area, multiplied by a factor that varies inversely with the relative 
costliness of the area.138  It also provides for “percentage quality 
increases,” i.e., bonus payments, for plans that meet certain quality 
standards, namely a ranking of four stars or higher (on a five-star 
scale).139 
One more section of the health reform legislation should be 
addressed:  Section 3021 of title III of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.140  This section “establish[es a] . . .  Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within” the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services.141  The purpose of this Center would be “to test 
innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program 
expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of care.”142  
This section perhaps provides an avenue for implementing the proposal 
presented in this article below. 
 
 132. Id. (specifying specific measures including “(i) Functional status improvement; (ii) 
Reducing rates of avoidable hospital readmissions; (iii) Rates of discharge to the community; (iv) 
Rates of admission to an emergency room after a hospitalization; (v) Incidence of health care 
acquired infections; (vi) Efficiency measures; (vii) Measures of patient-centeredness of care; (viii) 
Measures of patient perception of care.”). 
 133. Id. § 1501. 
 134. PPACA  §§ 1511-1515. 
 135. PPACA , §§ 1001-1304. 
 136. HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1102, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 137. Id. § 1102 (c)(3)(B)(iii). 
 138. Id. § 1102(n)(2)(C)(ii) (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 
1395w-23), § 1853(n)(2)(C)(ii)). 
 139. Id. § 1102 (c). 
 140. PPACA § 3021. 
 141. PPACA § 3021(a) (amending title XI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1320e-2), § 1115A(a)(1)). 
 142. Id. 
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V.  DETERMINING THE EFFICIENT METRIC FOR  
HEALTH CARE PAYMENTS 
In this section, we begin by explaining why our health care 
payment metric should be based solely on health outcomes and not 
include quality measures.  We then examine obstacles to using health 
outcomes as the sole metric.  Resolving these, we present a specific 
proposal where compensation depends on risk adjusted payments based 
solely on health outcomes. 
A. Why We Need to Base Payments Solely on Health Outcomes 
With the elimination of the competitive pricing reform, all of the 
remaining payment system reforms in the health care reform legislation 
emphasize the use of quality measurements to improve incentives.  In 
many cases, they combine this emphasis on quality with measures to 
reduce costs.  These cost measures, however, are derived via a 
comparison with the costs under the inappropriate incentives of the fee-
for-service system. 
At first glance, these reforms seem pretty good.  Better quality at 
lower cost—who would not want that?  Unfortunately, further 
introspection reveals that these reforms continue to distort incentives. 
The main problem is similar to what we saw before with pay for 
performance:  these payment systems based on quality measurements 
create strong incentives to follow the guidelines without a direct 
connection as to whether they are appropriate for an individual patient.  
More often than not, these guidelines probably present the best approach 
to treating the patient.  But individual variations are significant factors in 
practicing medicine.  These quality measurements, however, may 
provide a disincentive for adaptations based on an individual patient’s 
particular situation.  Researchers recommending the use of ACOs 
recognize the fundamental incompleteness of quality measures because, 
as noted above,143 they recommend transitioning in the future from 
“technical quality measures”144 to greater incorporation of measures of 
health outcomes. 
Instead of quality measurements, we will be better off moving 
exclusively to health outcomes metrics right away.  As Robert Kane 
explains, “The ‘outcomes’ examined in outcomes research are more 
likely to approximate what one ultimately wants health care to achieve—
 
 143. See supra Part III.C. 
 144. Fostering Accountable Health Care, supra note 89, at 223. 
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improvements in functional status and quality of life.”145  If these 
outcomes are our ultimate objective, then rewarding providers based on 
health outcomes themselves will generate appropriate incentives.  
Providers will still have an incentive to consult quality guidelines 
because those will lead to the best health outcomes in most cases.  
Meanwhile, for more idiosyncratic cases, providers will have the 
incentive to match the best treatment approach to their individual patient. 
The other problem with these reforms is that, while they might not 
increase overall costs as much as a fee-for-service system, the continued 
use of the FFS cost structure as their ultimate frame of reference means 
that the path of overall costs will continue to rise, without any ceiling.  
As we will see later, a system based on health outcomes might provide 
an opportunity—though it will be politically contentious—to place a 
ceiling on this trend. 
B. Obstacles to Using Health Outcomes as the Metric 
There are a number of obstacles to health outcomes as the 
determinant of how health providers are rewarded.  Doing this will place 
significant risks on providers, frequently for factors upon which they 
may have little control.146  We will address this problem more below,147 
but its solution depends upon applying these metrics to the appropriate 
level of providers. 
Another significant obstacle is the deficiency of relevant current 
data on health outcomes.  Some have noted a “lack of meaningful, 
actionable performance measures.”148  Mechanic and Altman note that 
although “process measures” such as the HEDIS data are available, 
“clinical outcome measures such as death and complication rates 
associated with surgery are more meaningful but are technically 
problematic.”149 
There may be a simple explanation for this lack of data:   there 
simply has been no incentive to produce it.150  With payments not 
dependent upon health outcomes, there is a strong disincentive for any 
single health provider to offer this data because, without a wide enough 
frame of reference, this data might open the provider up to criticism for 
 
 145. KANE, supra note 21, at 3. 
 146. Id. at 6. 
 147. See infra Part V.C. 
 148. Mechanic & Altman, supra note 51, at 264. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Note that some of the reforms in the legislation do require the collection and reporting of 
health outcome data. 
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poor performance in health outcomes.  This suggests that the provision 
of this information is a coordination problem, which might only be 
solved by a mandate under which all providers must provide this 
information. 
There is a similar problem in environmental protection.  Under a 
command-and-control environmental protection program, individual 
firms face disincentives to innovate in reducing pollution.  If any firm 
innovates, the improvement may become one of the technologies 
required of each firm in that industry.  In the end, the innovating firm is 
left with no advantage vis-à-vis its competitors, but faces possibly higher 
costs associated with the innovation. 
In order to solve this problem, environmental regulators sometimes 
must impose “technology-forcing” regulations.  These are regulations 
that require the adoption of environmental control technologies that 
reduce pollution below the amount possible at the time of the enactment 
of the regulations.  As a result, “technology-forcing” regulations must 
have required implementation dates far into the future beyond the date of 
enactment. 
This structure generates incentives for the development of 
improved control technologies.  In the time between the date of 
enactment and the date of implementation, an external vendor (supplier) 
of control technologies may develop an improved technology that meets 
the future standard.  Without the technology-forcing regulation, no 
individual firm would have had the incentive to purchase this 
technology, as noted above.  On the other hand, the availability of the 
technology means that firms will be unable to get the requirement for 
future implementation reversed (which might happen if the technology 
does not develop).  Consequently, individual firms will have strong 
incentives to purchase the innovative technology.  This in turn means 
that the technology vendor will have a significant incentive to develop 
this technology, under the condition of the technology-forcing 
regulation.151 
In a similar manner, compensating health providers on the basis of 
health outcome measurements would generate strong incentives to 
improve these measures.  A particular health plan may feel that current 
measures are inappropriate indicators of its performance.  With better 
measurements, it may expect to receive additional compensation for its 
 
 151. In essence, this is a reversal of Say’s law (which says that “Supply Creates its Own 
Demand”):  here, demand generates its own supply. 
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performance.  These expectations will provide an incentive for that plan 
to invest in improvements in health outcome measurements. 
Our experience with quality measurements for health care suggests 
that these improvements may be feasible.  As noted above, some 
suggested that the lackluster results of early pay-for-performance 
initiatives were due to inappropriate guidelines.  Nonetheless, the 
continued use of these initiatives generated incentives to develop 
improved methods of evaluating quality.  In a 2006 article, David Cutler 
noted: 
The most famous quality measurement initiatives are programs run by 
state governments that rate the quality of bypass surgery performed in 
their state. . . . Hospitals are required to submit to the state government 
information about the clinical risk factors of all patients receiving 
bypass surgery, and to indicate whether the patient died in the hospital 
or not.  The state then estimates a regression model to adjust death for 
the severity of condition.  Based on these regression models, hospital 
or physician residuals are calculated and reported.152 
Just as with quality measurements, we can expect these incentives 
to lead to significant improvements in measurements of health outcomes. 
Yet another obstacle with transitioning to a health-outcomes-based 
system would be the difficulty in determining specifically how such a 
system would operate.  While it might seem simple to “reward 
outcomes,” doing so in practice is complicated by the need to do risk 
adjustments and identify progress in outcomes.  In the next section, we 
present a specific proposal that lays out one methodology in rewarding 
providers based on outcomes.  In doing so, we discover an additional 
problem that was alluded to earlier:  political opposition to policy 
choices embedded in the reward structure. 
C. Proposal 
In this section, we propose one methodology for creating a payment 
system that rewards health providers for their effects on health 
outcomes.  In doing so, we need to ensure that our proposal includes risk 
adjustment.153  Risk adjustment factors adjust the amount of 
compensation a plan receives depending on the initial health 
 
 152. David M. Cutler, The Economics of Health System Payment, 154 DE ECONOMIST 1, 13 
(2006). 
 153. Risk adjustment is necessary to prevent “cherry-picking” by health plans.  Cherry-picking 
is where a health plan selectively enrolls only healthier beneficiaries. 
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characteristics of their enrollees.  These adjustments are essential.  Cutler 
notes, 
If insurers know that some elderly persons are healthy and others are 
sick, they will attempt to select the healthy and repel the sick.  This 
may be more attractive than managing care more efficiently.  I would 
attempt to limit risk selection by age-adjusting premiums and 
implementing more general risk adjustment methods.154 
Similarly, Berenson and Dowd have noted, “Initially, the AAPCC 
adjusted only for beneficiaries’ age, sex, disability, and institutional and 
Medicaid Status, and their county of residence,” but leaving out “health 
status variables” created opportunities for selection bias by health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs).155  The methodologies of risk 
adjustment have been developed for almost twenty years.156  Medicare 
has been using risk adjustment in consultations with health plans for 
over ten years,157 and risk adjustment also is included in many sections 
of the health reform legislation.158 
To provide proper incentives, this health payment system should 
reward providers for their differential effect on health outcomes.  In 
order to construct an estimate of this differential effect, we need to 
compare the specific providers’ set of health outcomes with some 
baseline.  To develop this baseline, we can turn to “comparative 
effectiveness” research in medical practice.159  This research examines 
 
 154. David M. Cutler, Cutting Costs and Improving Health:  Making Reform Work, 14 HEALTH 
AFF.  161, 166 (1995).  See also Cutler, supra note 35, at 54 (citing Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:  An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976); David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of 
Health Insurance, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper  No. 7176, 1999), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7176.pdf. 
 155. Berenson et al., supra note 71, at 31 (citing Randall S. Brown, Dolores Gurnick Clement, 
Jerrold W. Hill, Sheldon M. Retchin & Jeanette W. Bergeron, Do Health Maintenance 
Organizations Work for Medicare?, 15 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 7 (1993). 
 156. See, e.g., RANDALL S. BROWN, JEANETTE W. BERGERON, DOLORES GURNICK CLEMENT, 
JEROLD W. HILL & SHELDON M. RETCHIN,  THE MEDICARE RISK PROGRAM FOR HMOS –FINAL 
SUMMARY REPORT ON FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION  (1993), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/pic/reports/cms/4934.pdf. 
 157. Risk adjustment became part of Medicare policy under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  
See Joel S. Weissman, Melissa Wachterman & David Blumenthal, When Methods Meet Politics:  
How Risk Adjustment Became Part of Medicare Managed Care, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 475 
(2005). 
 158. See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1343, 124 Stat. 119, 212 (2010). 
 159. See, e.g., PETER R. ORSZAG, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL 
ROLE, Preface  (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-
ComparativeEffectiveness.pdf. 
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the evidence from published research reports on the effectiveness of 
medical treatment options.160  Some have used this research to develop 
models of treatment options.  One such model is the Archimedes Model, 
developed by David Eddy and others.161  This Model is a “full-scale 
simulation model of human physiology, diseases, behaviors, 
interventions, and healthcare systems.”162  As a model, the Archimedes 
Model takes inputs such as populations and health care systems; it then 
can determine the effects of interventions; and finally, it can then predict 
optimal health outcomes across these different interventions.163  
Consequently, this model can then be used to develop a baseline for the 
prediction of health outcomes for a given population.164 
With these considerations in mind, we will now specify a new 
payment model for health care.  We begin with some definitions of 
mathematical variables.  Let Qi be the quantity of individuals served by a 
particular health care provider, i.  Let Pi be a vector representing the 
characteristics of this population.  It will be of dimension Nx1, where N 
is the number of characteristics.  These characteristics will include 
particular characteristics utilized for risk adjustment.  Let Ωi be a vector 
representing the health outcomes experienced by this population over a 
particular time period.  It is of dimension Mx1, where M is the number 
of outcomes measured.  V will represent the assessed valuation of 
outcomes, and will be of dimension 1xM.  A will be a matrix 
representing the baseline treatment parameters, as determined by a 
comparative effectiveness model such as Archimedes, and will be of 
dimension MxN.  δi will be a matrix representing the differential 
treatment parameters of health care provider i (as contrasted with the 
baseline model), and will be of dimension MxN.  This matrix is not 
directly observed.  Finally, RABP will be a vector representing risk-
adjusted base payments to providers, and will be of dimension 1xN, i.e., 
one component corresponding to each population characteristic. 
Average health outcomes observed for provider i will follow this 
equation: 
 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Archimedes—Founders, ARCHIMEDES, http://archimedesmodel.com/about-archimedes-
incorporated.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 162. What is the Archimedes Model?, ARCHIMEDES, http://archimedesmodel.com/ 
archimedesmodel.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 163. See generally id. 
 164. See generally id. 
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Ωi = A* Pi - δi * Pi       
   (1) 
 
This equation states that the health outcomes observed for provider 
i will be diminished by the deviations of provider i as compared with the 
baseline.165 
Health care providers will be paid a base amount (RABP), and then 
the payment will be diminished according to a valuation in the deviation 
in treatment: 
 
Average Payment to Provider i = RABP* Pi – V * δi * Pi 
   (2) 
 
Although we do not observe δi, we can use the equation (1) to solve 
for an observable formula: 
 
 δi * Pi =  A* Pi - Ωi    =>  
Average Payment to Provider i = RABP* Pi – V * (A* Pi - Ωi)
   (3) 
 
Thus, the total payment to provider i will be: 
 
 Total Payment to Provider i = Qi * [RABP* Pi – V * (A* Pi - Ωi)]
   (4) 
 
Thus, providers will receive a payment that depends on the number 
of people serviced by them, a baseline amount, the particular risk 
characteristics of their population, and the health outcomes achieved by 
them.  Providers observe all of the variables in equation (2),166 including 
the providers’ own choice of δi.  They therefore can make optimal 
decisions for δi, balancing their costs with their payment benefits. 
D. Political Considerations Embedded in Vector V 
While this payment mechanism makes logical sense, we need to 
examine one component further:  vector V.  V specifies payment levels 
for each outcome from 1 to M.  In essence, each element of this vector 
then is a political decision:  How much should each outcome be 
 
 165. Note the provider may also have beneficial deviations which could lead to improved 
health outcomes. 
 166. And in effect, equation (4). 
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rewarded?  As we saw before with “competitive pricing,” specification 
of V may face significant political opposition.  Some may question the 
morality of placing a dollar value on a particular health outcome, while 
others may question why some outcomes are worth more than others. 
Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize that health care resources 
are scarce, and eventually, some choices must be made in allocating 
them.  As a result, there must be tradeoffs between achieving some 
outcomes instead of others.  Although contentious, specifying V will 
improve the transparency of these tradeoffs.  Doing so may also provide 
an opportunity to limit total expenditures on health care. 
VI.  IDENTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE SCALE 
In addition to specifying the payment formula, we also need to 
designate the individuals and institutions responsible for different stages 
of this payment reform policy.  These decisions are closely related to 
concerns about federalism in health care policy. 
A. Federalism and Economies of Scale 
While Michael Leavitt was Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), he described the essential federalist character of health 
care:  “Efforts to improve the quality and cost of health care start with 
national standards, but end with local control.”167  To enable this, Leavitt 
and HHS created “Chartered Value Exchanges” (CVEs) in which local 
community health care leaders would collaborate to improve 
performance and efficiency in the delivery of health care.168 
The need for these national standards is shown by the literature 
examining “geographic variation” in Medicare costs.169  This research 
finds significant geographic variations in per capita spending by 
Medicare:  “Per capita Medicare expenditures vary almost three-fold 
between the highest and lowest spending areas.”170  This research tries to 
determine the causes of this variation, to see whether it is “due to 
 
 167. The Cornerstone:  Building a Value-Driven Health-Care System for America, DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2007), http://archive.hhs.gov/valuedriven/cornerstone9.pdf. 
 168. See id.; Chartering Value Exchanges, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://archive.hhs.gov/valuedriven/communities/valueexchanges/exchanges.html (last visited Mar. 
31, 2011). 
 169. See, e.g., Marsha Gold, Geographic Variation in Medicare per Capita Spending:  Should 
Policy-Makers be Concerned?, SYNTHESIS PROJECT RESEARCH REP. NO. 6, Introduction (2004), 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/RWJF%20Medicare%20SYNTHESIS%20July04.pdf. 
 170. Id. at 4. 
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differences in population mix and prices across areas,”171 or whether it is 
something else.  This research concludes that “less than half the variation 
in spending across areas is explained by population mix and differences 
in the price of individual services.”172  Instead, this research finds that 
“[m]ore than half the variation in spending reflects differences in the use 
of services.”173  Nonetheless, while certain areas are spending more than 
others, “existing research indicates that people in higher spending areas 
do not receive better care.”174 
However, the question then becomes, how can we enable local 
control if we have national standards?  This is essentially a question of 
whether decentralized enforcement is possible.  In previous research on 
water quality, it was found that decentralized enforcement may only be 
feasible when “some metric can be found that is directly related to the 
enforcement actions of the decentralized agencies.”175  These metrics are 
available for health plans, and hence we may be able to capture some of 
the benefits from decentralized enforcement. 
In order to determine whether this is the optimal approach for this 
new payment reform policy, we will apply a federalism framework from 
an earlier article.176  To simplify analysis, this framework divides the 
examination of the appropriate locus across three institutions:  
enactment, implementation, and enforcement.177  Assessing the 
 
 171. Id. at 5. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 7. 
 174. Id. at 9.  See also Elliott S. Fisher, David E. Wennberg, Thérèse A. Stukel, Daniel J. 
Gottlieb, F. L. Lucas & Étoile L. Pinder, The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare 
Spending, Part 1:  The Content, Quality and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.  
273 (2003) [hereinafter Implications of Regional Variations]; John E. Wennberg, Elliott S. Fisher & 
Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography and the Debate over Medicare Reform, 21 HEALTH AFF. 96 (2002). 
 175. Dale B. Thompson, An Examination of the Consequences of Political, Administrative, and 
Legal Institutions on the Implementation and Performance of Environmental Policies 63 (1998) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author).  This chapter analyzed 
“whether a centralized or decentralized enforcement body is most appropriate for a policy directed 
at farming practices of members of irrigation districts.” Id. at 59.  A decentralized enforcement 
policy for irrigation districts was possible, because these “districts typically collect the runoff of 
their members in a system of pipes and canals, and then discharge the collective runoff into water 
bodies at a few particular points,” thereby enabling monitoring of the collective discharge.  Id. at 60.  
An individual district could then receive incentives based on its collective discharge, which would 
in turn provide an incentive for the district to encourage and possibly enforce best management 
practices by its members.  Id. 
 176. Dale B. Thompson, Optimal Federalism Across Institutions:  Theory and Applications 
from Environmental Policies and Health Care, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J, 437, 437 (2009). 
 177. Id. 
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appropriate scale is then done by “examining economies and 
diseconomies of scale inherent in each of these institutions.”178 
For a health care payment system paid with public funds, enactment 
would mean drafting the legislation that would set the general objectives 
and payment mechanisms, and providing the funding for these 
mechanisms.  Implementation would include determining the precise 
variables that will be utilized in this mechanism, overseeing the 
application of these mechanisms, and then adjusting the variables as 
needed to achieve the objectives of the legislation.  Enforcement would 
mean utilizing the payment scheme to affect the delivery of health care, 
i.e., identifying what type of parties are paid under this payment scheme.  
For each of these components, we then examine economies and 
diseconomies of scale to determine the appropriate locus. 
B. Locus of Enactment, Implementation, and Enforcement 
We now examine the optimal scale for each of these stages.  For 
enactment, there are significant economies of scale.  Implementing large 
scale programs such as Medicare is significantly costly.179  Due to large 
differences in incomes across different localities, financing these 
programs at a national level will be more feasible, and involve fewer 
disincentives due to higher taxes.180 
Also, we may desire to have consistency in the objectives for this 
health policy:  we may want to maintain and possibly improve the health 
status of eligible individuals across the country, regardless of where they 
live.  As noted above, many have pointed to the problems of significant 
geographic disparities in spending on health care and the delivery of 
health services.181  Having a consistent policy across the country would 
significantly reduce many of these geographic disparities.  Consistency 
in objectives would therefore lead to economies of scale in enactment.182 
On the other hand, some may argue that we have inconsistencies in 
objectives:  in allocating scarce resources, one area may prefer to devote 
more resources to health care than to other goods and services.  Despite 
this possibility, the ability of a state or locality to supplement spending 
on health care if it chooses means that this possible diseconomy will be 
less significant.  Consequently, we conclude that, overall, these 
 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 451 (“The cost of a policy is minimized by having as small a scale as possible.”).  
 180. For more on this economy, see generally id. 
 181. See GOLD, supra note 169, at 9; Implications of Regional Variations, supra note 174, at 
285; Wennberg et al., supra note 174, at 96. 
 182. See generally Thompson, supra note 176. 
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economies suggest that this policy should be enacted at the federal level 
rather than at a state or local level. 
If enactment is done at the federal level, this policy could be 
implemented either at the federal level or at a state level.183  There can be 
diseconomies of scale in implementation, because of the possible 
benefits of experimentation across different states, i.e., the laboratories 
of democracy.184  However, one of the problems noted earlier was the 
significant geographic variation in Medicare spending.185  Again, to 
enable more consistency in the application of this payment system, 
implementation should also be done at the federal level, with a federal 
agency, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
determining the specific variables to be used for assessing quality and 
outcomes and the parameters related to these variables. 
Enforcement is a key concern here.  We could enforce at the lowest 
level—the level of the individual doctor.  Other choices include practice 
level (groups of some doctors) payment, a level similar to an accountable 
care organization, the level of a health plan, or possibly a state-wide 
level.  There is an inherent tradeoff between flexibility and risk in 
enforcing these policies.  A policy that rewards a particular set of health 
care actions such as P4P involves very little risk for doctors, but the net 
effect of this policy is to diminish flexibility as it rewards that particular 
set of actions and by extension discourages others. 
On the other hand, an outcomes-based policy enables a wide array 
of health care actions, as long as these actions achieve the desired 
outcomes.  Nonetheless, these policies bring with them significant risks.  
Health outcomes are dependent on a number of factors outside the 
control of individual doctors.  While risk adjustment can correct for 
some of these factors, a number of other factors will remain.  Hence, in 
an outcomes-based payment system, the health providers will necessarily 
face significant risks that their payment depends on factors outside of 
their control.  Larger organizations can bear risk more effectively, and so 
there is an economy of scale here. 
 
 183. A federal policy can be implemented at the state level by requiring states to develop 
implementation plans, with the provision that if a state fails to develop an appropriate plan, a federal 
agency will then be responsible for implementing the policy in the state.  This provides a significant 
incentive for states to develop their own implementation plan. 
 184. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”).  See also Thompson, supra note 176. 
 185. See GOLD, supra note 169, at 9; Implications of Regional Variations, supra note 174, at 
285; Wennberg et al., supra note 174, at 96. 
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Another consideration is the ability of the enforcement body to 
utilize decentralized enforcement.  As noted above, decentralized 
enforcement can be ineffective without a metric that depends on the 
enforcement actions of the decentralized body.  However, in this case, 
we do have such a metric in the measures of health outcomes.  While 
decentralized enforcement is possible here, we still need to examine 
related economies and diseconomies. 
In the end, individual patients in consultation with their personal 
doctors make the ultimate decisions on health care.  These decisions 
consist of choices on the application of particular medical procedures 
and treatments, along with lifestyle choices.  Providing an incentive to 
improve health outcomes will therefore generate incentives to determine 
appropriate medical procedure and treatment options, provide informed 
recommendations over these options based on the individual patient’s 
particular circumstances, and to encourage beneficial lifestyle choices.  
The first two of these acts are done directly by individual doctors, and 
the third frequently involves acts of individual doctors.  Consequently, 
any payment system whose enforcement locus is above the individual 
doctor level will necessarily depend on decentralized enforcement, with 
corollary incentive systems directed at individual doctors and individual 
beneficiaries. 
Assessing the desirability of treatment options and lifestyle choices 
may vary depending on locality, custom, and other individual aspects.  
As a result, these corollary incentive systems will need to be 
appropriately tailored to the individual circumstances of doctors and 
beneficiaries.  As the number of doctors and beneficiaries increases, this 
tailoring becomes more complex.  Consequently, this will lead to a 
diseconomy of scale in enforcement.  In the next section, we will balance 
these economies and diseconomies in enforcement and conclude that the 
appropriate locus of enforcement will be at the plan level. 
C. Why Enforce at Plan Level 
Enforcement could take place at a number of different levels.  It 
could be done at the level of individual doctors or group practices.  
Accountable care organizations could also be the focus, directly 
receiving the payments based on health outcomes, and then using 
decentralized enforcement to create incentives among its practitioners to 
improve outcomes.  Focusing on ACOs would provide many benefits for 
both effectiveness and efficiency, as this would enable coordination of 
care.  Finally, we could enforce at the health insurance plan level, again 
relying upon decentralized enforcement. 
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We would face a number of problems if we chose to enforce at the 
level of individual doctors or group practices.  Doctors are significantly 
concerned about the risks they may face under non fee-for-service 
payment mechanisms.  Ronald Castellanos, a commissioner on 
MedPAC, noted: 
[P]roviders recognize a need to change Medicare fee-for-service 
incentives and some inquiries into ACOs have been made in his area.  
“But then the doctors in my community look at me and say, ‘Why do 
you want to do this?  Why do you want to move away from what we 
call a very robust, perhaps overly funded in some respects, less-risk 
program to go into something like this?  They say what’s the incentive 
that I have just to improve quality and resource use?”186 
As Elliott Fisher and others noted, individual doctors do not want to 
face risks associated with external factors:  “[P]roviders [prefer] to be 
held accountable only for care that is within their direct control.”187  This 
is also related to doctors’ preference for autonomy:  “Physician practice 
and professional identity in the United States have long been 
characterized by a high degree of professional autonomy and a culture of 
individual responsibility . . . .  Many physicians will resist the notion of 
accepting a degree of responsibility for the care of all patients within 
their local delivery system.”188 
Instead of directing a policy at individual doctors because of the 
risks entailed, we need to direct the policy at a larger organization.  
There are certainly a number of variables affecting health outcomes that 
are not in the control of individual doctors.  While some of these may be 
accounted for through the use of risk adjustment, many will remain.  
However, these individual risks can be balanced out when a large 
enough sample size is used.189  Within these large samples, individuals 
with unobserved negative characteristics are balanced by other 
individuals with unobserved positive characteristics.  The larger the 
 
 186. Jane Norman, MEDPAC Probes Effectiveness of Accountable Care Organizations, WASH. 
HEALTH POL’Y WK. IN REV., Apr. 13, 2009, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
Content/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policy-in-Review/2009/Apr/April-20-2009/MEDPAC-
Probes-Effectiveness-of-Accountable-Care-Organizations.aspx. 
 187. Fisher et al., supra note 60, at 44.  See also KANE, supra note 21, at 5. 
 188. Fisher et al., supra note 60, at 54.  See also Thomas P. Miller, Troyen A. Brennan & 
Arnold Milstein, How Can We Make More Progress in Measuring Physicians’ Performance to 
Improve the Value of Care?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1429, 1429 (2009) (noting that “many physicians 
resist individual attribution”). 
 189. See KANE, supra note 21, at 7 (“Outcomes are essentially probability statements.  Because 
outcomes can be influenced by many different factors, one should not try to judge the success of any 
single case; instead outcomes are addressed in the aggregate.”). 
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sample size, the greater the probability that this balancing can occur.190  
While physician groups may service many more patients than individual 
doctors, we have seen that even large physician groups do not provide a 
sufficiently large sample size:  “Two years’ experience by the California 
P4P program, however, reveals that the requisite claims data often are 
incomplete or poorly coded and that even large physician groups have 
too few patients experiencing most types of episodes to permit 
statistically valid measurement for public reporting and incentive 
payment.”191 
ACOs may be sufficiently large enough to enable this sharing of 
risks.  The minimum size for an ACO recommended in the June 2009 
MedPAC report was “at least 5,000 patients.”192  It is more likely that 
health insurance plans would meet this need.  Health plans carry a very 
large number of enrollees.  In a survey conducted by America’s Health 
Insurance Plans in 2001, the average number of “HMO/POS enrollees 
per health insurance plan was 161,186 while the average number of 
Medicaid HMO enrollees was 93,698, and the average number of 
Medicare HMO enrollees was 58,822.”193  For this economy of scale, 
health insurance plans’ significantly larger size than even ACOs gives 
them an advantage. 
In addition to large sample sizes, we will also need to look to 
organizations that are prepared to respond to changes in financial 
incentives.  Charles Kahn notes that “payment reform succeeds in 
achieving its intended result only when the targets of that reform are 
organizationally and culturally able to meet the mandate of reformed 
payment.”194  These organizations will need the flexibility to adjust and 
adapt to what their data implies for their effectiveness at achieving 
desired health outcomes. 
ACOs should be ready to adapt to changes in incentives.  They are 
designed, in particular, to be large enough to enable the coordination in 
health care needed to achieve better outcomes.195 
Health plans also should be prepared to respond to changes in 
financial incentives.  As profit-driven organizations, there will be no 
 
 190. See id. (“Because outcomes rely on group data, there must be enough cases to analyze.”). 
 191. Robinson et al., supra note 63, at 1438. 
 192. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 40. 
 193. AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, 2002 AHIP SURV. HEALTH INS. PLANS 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/2_2002SurvChartBook.pdf.  These averages were 
over the 338 health plans in the sample.  Id. 
 194. Charles N. Kahn III, Payment Reform Alone Will Not Transform Health Care Delivery, 28 
HEALTH AFF. 216, 217 (2009). 
 195. See June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 51-52. 
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stigma attached to responding to these direct financial incentives.  
Furthermore, health plans have significant flexibility.  Bryan Dowd and 
Robert Berenson explain many of the benefits of private plans: 
Private plans face no such constraints; like any private industry, plans 
have full discretion to spend to improve efficiency or respond to 
consumers’ preferences, and they do not have to live within arbitrarily 
separate administrative and service budgets.  Not only can private 
plans increase administrative spending when there is a positive return 
on that investment, they can spend even more if doing so provides 
services for which their enrollees are willing to pay.  For example, a 
private plan might add more staff to its telephone or Internet helplines 
to reduce waiting times, if enrollees were willing to pay higher 
premiums for the improved service.  The incentive for private health 
plans to make such investments is fairly clear:  the threat of reduced 
enrollment.  The government’s incentive is less clear. 
. . . . 
Private health plans, on the other hand, enjoy considerable freedom to 
negotiate contracts with providers and to test innovative care 
management and payment strategies.  Private plans also may be more 
successful at some types of innovation than the CMS.196 
This ability of plans to adopt innovative care management tools is 
echoed by researchers at the U.S. Department of Human Services:  
“Many believe that private coordinated care plans are in a position to 
implement such programs and better tailor care to individual 
beneficiaries’ needs.”197 
While both organization types may be prepared to respond to 
changes in financial incentives, ACOs may have some advantages over 
health plans due to a diseconomy of scale related to decentralized 
enforcement.  The capability to use decentralized enforcement to 
develop appropriately tailored incentives will depend on the 
organizations’ familiarity with the particular environment.  An ACO 
would be located in a single locality, whereas health insurance plans will 
frequently be spread across multiple localities.  Informational needs to 
develop decentralized incentives will mean that it will be easier to tailor 
incentives for doctors participating in an ACO than for a health plan.198 
 
 196. Berenson et al., supra note 71, at 36. 
 197. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS,  supra note 3, at 25. 
 198. The difficulties of managing large networks of doctors can be seen by examining the 
challenges faced by diversified health organizations such as UnitedHealth Group. 
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On the other hand, ACOs’ more localized nature can also be a 
disadvantage.  There are likely to be significant unobservable199 regional 
differences that affect health outcomes.  In an article about the 
controversy surrounding the possible overstatement of achievable health-
care cost savings published in the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, the 
authors stated, “But the real difference in costs between, say, Houston 
and Bismarck, N.D., may result less from how doctors work than from 
how patients live.  Houstonians may simply be sicker and poorer than 
their Bismarck counterparts.”200  Consequently, ACOs who are located 
in a single locality will then face higher risks than health plans due to 
these unobservable regional differences. 
These risks and other risks associated with unobservable causes of 
health outcomes are likely to be amplified in the nascent development of 
health outcomes metrics.  As argued above, the dependency of payments 
on health outcome metrics should lead to the refinement and 
improvement of these metrics.  As a result, these risks will be reduced.  
However, at this point in time, these measures remain incomplete, and 
the significantly larger size of health plans compared with ACOs gives 
health plans an important advantage in being able to spread these risks. 
When all of these economies and diseconomies of scale are 
considered, it seems that, at this point in time, health insurance plans’ 
better ability to spread these risks outweighs ACOs’ easier task of 
tailoring decentralized incentives.  As a result, for now, we should direct 
enforcement of this new payment system based on health outcomes to 
health insurance plans. 
VII.  APPLYING THIS PAYMENT SYSTEM TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 
Thus, we have seen that this payment system should be enacted and 
implemented at the federal level, with the payments directed to health 
insurance plans.  Health plans will then utilize decentralized enforcement 
to provide direct incentives to their participating health providers to 
improve health outcomes.  The question then arises, where could we 
apply this payment system?  A natural application of this system would 
be to MA. 
MA is the program under which Medicare beneficiaries can choose 
a private health plan to supply their medical care.201  The private plan 
 
 199. I.e., differences that cannot be accounted for in risk adjustments. 
 200. Reed Abelson & Gardiner Harris, Study Cited for Health-Cost Cuts Overstated Its Upside, 
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at A1, A18. 
 201. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS,  supra note 3, at v. 
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then contracts with doctors and hospitals to provide health care 
services.202  The MA program had its beginning as the “Medicare + 
Choice” program, which was started under the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997.203  Under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, the name of 
the program was changed to MA.204  The reach of the program is now 
fairly extensive:  “About 22 percent of Medicare beneficiaries were 
enrolled in MA plans in 2008 and all beneficiaries have access to an MA 
plan in 2009.” 205  Given that Medicare spending itself represents twenty-
two percent of the entire national spending on health care in 2007,206 MA 
on its own is responsible for approximately four to five percent. 
Prior to the recent health reform legislation package, health plans 
were paid using a capitation model under MA:  “The annual per capita 
rate of payment for each class of Medicare enrollees is equal to 95 
percent of the AAPCC [adjusted average per capita cost] (as determined 
under the provisions of §417.588) for that class of Medicare 
enrollees.”207  Under a capitation payment, a plan is paid a certain 
amount for each enrollee, but then the plan bears the risk if average 
spending exceeds the capitated amount.  MA does adjust these payments 
based on risk adjustment factors, such as geographic, enrollment, age, 
sex, disability status, and “welfare and institutional status.”208 
These capitation rates are determined through a bidding process.209  
Plans submit bids for their expected average costs, and then the bids are 
compared with county-level benchmarks.210  If the bids exceed the 
benchmark, then the plan’s enrollees must be charged the excess as a 
premium.211  If bids are lower than the benchmark, the “plan receives 
75% as a rebate, which must be returned to enrollees in the form of 
additional benefits or reduced premiums.”212 
 
 202. Participating plans must offer a defined bundle of benefits, but may provide additional 
ones. 
 203. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (2009), 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-12.pdf [hereinafter MA Fact Sheet]. 
 204. See Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, Summary of Medicare Act of 2003, (2004), 
http://www.nls.org/conf2004/summary-medicare-act-2003.htm. 
 205. MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT,  supra note 6, at xix. 
 206. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK:  HEALTHCARE SPENDING AND 
THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 5 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/ 
Jun09DataBooksec1.pdf. 
 207. CMS Payment to HMOs Rule, Determination of Rate, 42 C.F.R. § 417.584(b)(1) (2010).  
 208. CMS Computation of Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 417.588 
(2010). 
 209. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 7. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. MA Fact Sheet, supra note 203, at 2. 
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Large plans play a significant role in MA:  “Three firms—
UnitedHealthcare, Humana, and Kaiser—plus firms affiliated with 
BCBS [Blue Cross Blue Shield] account for more than half (53 percent) 
of MA enrollment at the end of 2007.”213  In addition to these large 
plans, there have been many new entrants recently:  “The number of 
firms offering PFFS plans has more than quadrupled over the past three 
years.”214  However, some of these recent entrants provide lower quality 
care than more established plans:  “Quality is not uniform among MA 
plans. . . .  More recent plans have lower rankings on many measures.”215 
Payment rates for MA plans have exceeded the average costs under 
the traditional fee-for-service structure of traditional Medicare:216  “MA 
payments per enrollee are projected to be 114 percent of comparable 
FFS spending for 2009.” 217  These higher payments in turn allow the 
plans to “offset cost sharing for Medicare benefits and cover additional 
services that traditional Medicare is not authorized to offer.”218  These 
benefits have had a significant effect on the growth of MA.219 
MedPAC recently advocated payment system reforms for MA.220  
MedPAC was concerned that the payment rates for MA were set too 
high:  “Instead of encouraging innovative plans, the current MA 
payment system encourages inefficient plans, because the benchmarks 
used as bidding targets are set too high, and plan payments are not linked 
to performance.”221  Consequently, many, including the Obama 
Administration, recommended reducing payments to MA plans.222  
MedPAC suggested a variety of revised methods to calculate MA 
benchmarks.223 
Included in these options was the use of competitive bidding.  A 
policy paper issued by researchers at the U.S. Department of Human 
Services suggested, “For a number of reasons, moving away from 
 
 213. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage in 2008, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ii (2008), 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7775.pdf [hereinafter MA in 2008]. 
 214. Id. 
 215. MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT, supra note 6, at 252. 
 216. See MA in 2008, supra note 213, at iii-iv. 
 217. MARCH 2009 MEDPAC REPORT,  supra note 6, at xix. 
 218. MA in 2008, supra note 213, at iv. 
 219. Id. 
 220. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 155. 
 221. Id. at 202. 
 222. See OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 73, at 69.  See also PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS,  
supra note 3, at vi (describing five options for changing the benchmarks used to pay MA plans).  
 223. June 2009 MEDPAC Report, supra note 33, at 184-99.  See also PAYMENT FOR MA 
PLANS, supra note 33, at 21 (noting three other rationales for MA plans receiving a higher average 
payment than fee-for-service plans). 
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administered benchmarks to ones set through a competitive bidding 
process would be a preferred method for modifying current payments.” 
224 
As noted above, the health care reform legislation package included 
a number of changes to MA.  Payment rates are scheduled to be reduced, 
and a number of new regulations apply to health plans participating in 
MA.  Nonetheless, the basic structure remains:  health plans still receive 
a risk-adjusted per-capita payment for each beneficiary that enrolls with 
them. 
The proposal presented by this article would require additional 
amendments to part C of title XVIII of the Social Security Act.225  Under 
this proposal, large health plans participating in MA would be 
required226 to submit health outcomes data, and then receive their 
compensation solely on the basis of these health outcomes metrics, after 
appropriate risk-adjustments.  Health plans under MA already submit 
much of the data needed here:  “MA plans are required to submit several 
types of data on quality measures, including: Healthcare Effectiveness 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS), Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems (CAHPS), and Health Outcomes Survey 
(HOS).”227  Population data is also collected to determine risk 
adjustment factors, under the current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services Hierarchical Condition Category (CMS-HCC) risk adjustment 
system.228 
 
 224. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at vi (noting, however, that “there are a number 
of important policy questions to address with regard to the exact structure of the bidding process and 
potential competition with the traditional program”). 
 225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395W-21-1395w-28 (2010). 
 226. While a voluntary approach could work, the uncertainties involved imply that many plans 
might choose to continue in the more certain per capita payment system.  Significant participation 
would probably be needed in order to get advancements in health outcomes metrics.  As a result, a 
mandatory approach may be necessary to make the program achievable in the long run. 
 227. PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at 7.  See also memorandum from Cynthia G. 
Tudor, Director, Medicare Drug Benefit and C & D Data Group, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs, 2009 HEDIS, HOS and CAHPS Measures for Reporting by Medicare Managed Care 
Contractors, 1-2 (Dec. 9, 2008), https://www.cms.gov/SpecialNeedsPlans/Downloads/ 
HEDIS09Measures_120908.pdf  (noting that HMOs and preferred provider organizations [PPOs] 
are required to submit this data for 2009, and that private fee-for-service organizations [PFFS] will 
be required to submit this data in 2010). 
 228. See JAMES M. VERDIER, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE RATE SETTING AND RISK ADJUSTMENT:  
A PRIMER FOR STATES CONSIDERING CONTRACTING WITH MEDICARE ADVANTAGE SPECIAL NEEDS 
PLANS TO COVER MEDICAID BENEFITS  8 (2006), available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/ 
Medicare_Advantage_State_Primer.pdf.  For details on the specific factors utilized, see Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Announcement of Calendar Year 2007 Medicare Advantage 
Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies, Enclosure IV (2006), 
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As the federal agency responsible for implementing this policy, the 
CMS would then be responsible for using this data to compensate health 
plans.  In order to do so, CMS would first have to establish vectors 
RABP and V, along with matrix A.229  One of the more difficult tasks 
would be to specify V, the vector of the associated valuations of 
different health outcomes.  In constructing this vector, CMS would begin 
by offering initial estimates of these valuations.  CMS would then go 
back to historical data to determine whether the compensation paid out 
hypothetically under the new system using population and outcome data 
from previous years would be approximately the same as their actual 
compensation in those years.  CMS could then scale the compensation 
factors in vector V to better match hypothetical and actual compensation.  
Scaling would preserve the relative valuations between different 
outcomes. 
Initially, to ensure support of affected health plans, it may be 
necessary for these factors to “overcompensate” these plans.  This 
“overcompensation” may lead to similar criticisms as others have made 
about MA’s overcompensation relative to Medicare FFS.  However, 
what these criticisms fail to account for are the risks faced by these 
plans.  Under FFS, providers face no risk on their level of compensation, 
because they are compensated for all of the services they provide.  On 
the other hand, with a capitated system such as the current MA system, 
providers face the risk that their beneficiaries may require more-than-
average levels of services.  These providers will not receive any 
additional compensation for these extra services, and so the providers 
bear these risks that their costs may be higher than these capitated rates.  
In a similar manner, switching to the new payment system based on 
health outcomes will also bring significant risks to participating health 
plans. 
Furthermore, these criticisms about possible overcompensation are 
misplaced.  Our first priority should not be a slight “overpayment” in the 
initial iterations of this system, but rather on the future trend of health 
care expenditures.  We have seen a similar path before in the design of 
the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) emissions 
trading program for the Los Angeles area.230  For RECLAIM, the initial 
amount of emission permits initially allocated was slightly greater than 
the amount of emissions generated in previous years.  However, these 
                                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/ 
Announcement2007.pdf.  
 229. See supra Part V.C. 
 230. See Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets:  
Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J.  645 (2000). 
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allocation levels were reduced by approximately forty percent in later 
years.231  Similarly, an initial “overpayment” under this system should be 
less significant than reducing the escalation of future health 
expenditures. 
In the first iterations of this system, CMS would then combine their 
generated vectors RABP and V, matrix A, and reported information in 
vectors Pi and Ωi, to calculate the compensation for a particular plan.  
Future iterations would be even more significant.  Progress on health 
outcome measures and risk adjustment could be incorporated into 
revisions of the compensation formula.  Additionally, with the 
exceptions of adjustments for overall inflation, it could be desirable for 
the base rates and valuation measures to remain constant.  If so, this 
would imply that health care expenditures under this system would only 
increase as the measures of health outcomes improved.  As these 
measures improved (thereby reducing the risks involved), additional 
levels of providers such as ACOs could then be incorporated into this 
system. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
This article proposes changing MA232 so that participating health 
plans are compensated solely on the basis of health outcomes, with 
appropriate risk adjustments.  It makes this proposal because health 
outcomes metrics are a better instrument for compensating health care 
providers.  Additionally, the article finds that the optimal scale for using 
this instrument at this time is at the level of health insurance plans, 
making MA an ideal initial setting for this system. 
There have been many other recommendations to address the 
inefficient incentives created under the dominant health payment system, 
fee-for-service.  These recommendations include pay-for-performance, 
competitive pricing, accountable care organizations (ACOs), and 
bundled payments.  Each one of these recommendations plays some role 
in the landmark health reform legislative package, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act. 
However, these recommendations and the package of reforms in the 
legislation fail to address perhaps the most significant problem for health 
 
 231. See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 1997 AIR QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN ch.2 app.III, at III-2-29 tab.2-10A  (1996), available at ftp://ftp.aqmd.gov/ 
pub/aqmp/appendix/ap3.exe. 
 232. Doing so requires amending title XVIII, part C, of the Social Security Act. 
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care:  the need to control costs in the long term.  This is because they 
still rely on quality measurements and the delivery of services.  This 
article argues that the best way to control costs in the long run is to 
reward providers based solely on health outcomes. 
There are a number of obstacles to using this metric.  Doctors will 
oppose a system where they are held accountable for health outcomes 
when these outcomes depend so much on the patient’s own choices.  
This article suggests that the solution to this is to utilize decentralized 
enforcement, where a large collection of health care providers is held 
responsible for health outcomes.  By using decentralized enforcement, 
the collective body can determine properly tailored incentives for their 
individual providers, which will not hold individual doctors accountable 
for each individual patient but nonetheless still lead to overall 
improvements in health outcomes.233 
Another criticism is that the health outcomes measures themselves 
are not sufficiently developed.  What this criticism means is that using 
these measures will entail significant risks.  But it does not mean that we 
should not use these measures:  instead, operation of this compensation 
system will likely lead to significant improvements in the quality of 
these measures. 
This article then uses a federalism framework to determine the 
appropriate scale for different stages of applying this payment method 
policy.  It concludes that the optimal level to enact and implement the 
policy is at the federal level. 
It then compares economies and diseconomies of scale to determine 
the optimal locus of enforcement, i.e., what group of providers would be 
held accountable by tying their payment solely to health outcomes.  
Accountable care organizations would be a good group to utilize because 
they could design narrowly tailored incentives for their providers.  
However, this article concludes that health insurance plans would be a 
better level for enforcement.  Like the ACOs, health plans can also use 
decentralized enforcement.  Their broader size both in terms of number 
of enrollees and in geographical coverage means that health plans will 
also be better at handing the significant risks entailed in this payment 
system.  This is particularly true during the initial operation of this 
system, when outcomes measures have yet to be fully developed. 
Given that what is needed is a federal program where health plans 
are compensated, this article suggests that the natural place to implement 
this payment system is MA.  There certainly will be political opposition 
 
 233. Quality measurements could be utilized here. 
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to making this change just as we saw with competitive bidding,234 
notably in specifying compensation levels for different health outcomes.  
Nonetheless, there are significant advantages to implementing it in MA.  
Much of the data needed to use this system is available because health 
plans are already required to collect and report it. 
Meanwhile, while it may be difficult to achieve politically, doing so 
will enable us to finally get incentives right for health care.  This system 
does not reward providers for supplying any health service, regardless of 
effectiveness or desirability, as is sometimes done by a FFS system.  It 
also does not reward providers for offering services that meet prescribed 
quality guidelines, which may not permit sufficient flexibility for some 
individual patients.  Instead, it rewards providers for maintaining and 
improving health outcomes, thereby enabling them to “experience the 
joy of healing those who seek [their] help.”235 
This approach offers an opportunity to finally control the long-term 
growth of health care expenditures.  In this system, if health care 
outcomes stay the same, risk-adjusted real236 expenditures on health care 
can remain constant.  Under this approach, health care expenditures only 
rise when overall health care outcomes improve.  Those health care 
dollars may be worth it. 
 
 
 234. See PAYMENT FOR MA PLANS, supra note 3, at vi (noting that “in the past . . . , health 
plans and their supporters have resisted such a bidding approach”); id. at 18 (noting that “a 
[competitive bidding] system, as in any competitive market, means increased uncertainty about the 
chances for reward and the risk of financial loss for participants.  Previous experience with 
Medicare’s competitive pricing demonstrations, which were opposed by the insurance industry, 
suggests that health plans are reluctant to participate under such pricing uncertainty”) (citing 
Berenson et al., supra note 71)). 
 235. Louis Lasagna, The Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version (1964), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
nova/doctors/oath_modern.html. 
 236. As opposed to nominal. 
